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Abstract 
Managed retreat (MR) involves permanent resettlement of existing households and 
communities away from areas at risk, here coastal flood risk. On post-Sandy Staten Island, 
New York, where MR has been successful, our research findings from interviews and a focus 
group of key stakeholders and commentators indicate there are very significant political 
impediments as well as financial constraints to MR programs being successful without the 
experience of a disaster and a repetitive sequence of hazardous events. Pre-disaster and 
long-term plans for reducing risks in such vulnerable areas are easy to advocate but not to 
implement. Many coastal locations globally will need some form of MR, where current risk is 
very high as a legacy of past decisions and where many communities will not be defendable 
against the expected future sea level rise. With leadership and community commitment 
locally MR agendas can and should be pursued: the optimistic scenario. But success appears 
likely only in the aftermath of a major disaster. This suggests strongly that we may have to 
await those inevitable disasters, and then be ready to act, rather than vice versa: a worrying 
conclusion and a dismal prognosis. 
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1. Introduction 
Managed retreat as an adaptation to flood risk and climate change is much advocated but 
seldom achieved (Wong et al,2014; Hino et al.,2017). We approach this subject with the view 
that many coastal locations globally will need to consider this option, where current risk is 
very high as a legacy of past decisions and where many communities will not be defendable 
against the sea level rise expected by 2100 (Nicholls et al,2010; Hauer et al,2016). We also 
see implementation, however, as highly problematic.  
Managed retreat (hereinafter MR) covers a multitude of actions, including community 
relocation, abandoning agricultural land, or simple habitat creation (Esteves, 2014). Here we 
restrict ourselves to a process that involves permanent resettlement of existing households 
and communities away from areas at risk (RPA, 2015). We also restrict our attention here to a 
voluntary process, not mandatory retreat or „resettlement‟, because that would often be 
resisted, especially by those at risk, creating additional complexities (Hino et al.,2017; 
Bukvic et al,2015; Amnesty International,2008; World Bank, 2010; Nkwunonwo et al., 
2016).  
Most definitions of MR relevant here refer to vacating or re-purposing areas that were once 
developed and are now facing major disaster impacts (e.g. Alexander et al, 2012, 409). The 
land is permanently cleared and „returned to nature‟; alternatively, clearance may allow 
selective resilient rebuilding. Both may occur covering whole communities or gradually, 
property by property. The lexicon of terms includes managed retreat and buyouts (herein 
used), setbacks, managed realignment and permanent relocation. Generally, the policy is 
unpopular if communities are affected: most people do not welcome the need to move. 
Without individual householder decisions to relocate, however, voluntary MR will not occur. 
De Vries and Fraser (2012,15) suggest that a process of collective institution-based guidance 
is also necessary to negotiate outcomes, to prohibit redevelopment, and to provide the 
resources necessary for the property acquisition fundamental to a MR program that involves 
some form of government funding. Unless the affected communities can agree in sufficient 
numbers the policy can be inoperative or almost totally ineffective by leaving numerous 
isolated and vulnerable “holdouts” that are expensive to service. Inherent is a social 
multi-party process involving both the affected communities and the agencies of government, 
teasing out in that process a form of Rousseau‟s social contract between the government and 
the governed (Rousseau,1672) concerning the issues of risk and risk reduction. 
Research into successful MR as an adaption to flood risk at the coast, voluntarily undertaken, 
is almost non-existent (see Hino et al., 2017). In this paper our objective is to address the 
conditions for MR success via property buyout programs in flood vulnerable areas, based on 
post-disaster interviews and a focus group. Our locus is the Borough of Staten Island, New 
York City (NYC), where three coastal neighbourhoods, located in the 1:100 year floodplain, 
comprise our research areas owing to the success of voluntary buyout programs there (Ocean 
Breeze; Graham Beach; Oakwood Beach (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Enhanced buyout areas on Staten Island, New York City.  Provided for use by 
the authors by Staten Island community representatives 
NB one mile = 0.625km 
Much of NYC was badly affected by „Superstorm Sandy‟1 but we chose to study Staten 
Island, first, because it suffered massive damage and 24 fatalities, more than any other NYC 
Borough
2
, creating the incentive for a risk-reducing response. Secondly, this community is 
possibly as antipathetic to external intervention and as anti-government as anywhere in the 
                                                        
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effects_of_Hurricane_Sandy_in_New_York 
2 http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/10/remembering_hurricane_sandys_v.html Accessed 21.12.15 
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USA (Kramer and Flanagan, 2012). Notwithstanding this, paradoxically, MR has been 
successful here, on a large scale, facilitated and funded by New York State agencies, and we 
judged that research here may provide pointers for its prospects elsewhere. An important 
issue here is consensus, and whether it can be generated for MR when individual private 
homeowner interests are at stake (leading to a wish to stay) yet success depends on a 
significant majority of those affected agreeing to MR program implementation, without 
which the “holdout” problem becomes acute. We see consensus as more than just this 
agreement, but solidarity of belief or sentiment (Hartnett, 2011). This concerns both the 
decision and the process of reaching a decision on the need for action. Agreement on 
implementation and outcomes is also needed, so as to ensure effectiveness, and on the 
absence of realistic alternatives.  
2. Opposition, Advocacy and Limitations 
Permanently resettling existing households and communities away from areas at risk can 
incite opposition. The ability to withstand nature, by not retreating, fuels pride and social 
cohesion in the communities affected (De Vries and Fraser 2012). Some Staten Island 
residents evidenced their objection via painted slogans (“You can take our home, but you 
can‟t take our heart!”3). To them, “setbacks” and “retreat” were unacceptable defeat. The 
NYC post-Sandy Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency report endorsed this 
perspective (NYC SIRR, 2013), presenting adaptation options without mentioning retreat and 
citing New York‟s “toughness”, defined as an unwillingness to retreat or surrender. 
Managed retreat in its various forms is nevertheless widely advocated by many international 
organisations: the OECD (2010), Linham and Nicholls (2010), UNU-IHDP (2015) and the 
World Bank (2016). The idea has been explored in many countries (e.g. Breetzke et al, 2008; 
Hart, 2011; Mather and Stretch, 2012; Ryan et al, 2012; Barron et al, 2012; Roca and Villares, 
2012). National governments have advocated its adoption: the UK is hoping for major coastal 
realignment in England and Wales by 2030 (Defra and EA, 2002; CCC, 2013; O‟Riordan et 
al, 2014); MR in the USA aims at assisting coastal risk reduction requirements for 
unprotectable areas (NWF, 1998; NOAA, 2014; Kousky, 2014, Siders, 2013). The general 
objective is to reduce vulnerability to flooding and rising sea levels with global climate 
change (IPCC, 2001, 2014; EPA, 2009; Defra and EA, 2002), offering complementary 
ecosystem enhancement (McGranahan et al,2007; UNEP,2016; CCC,2013; DEFRA/EA,2002; 
Esteves,2014) and some favourable cost:benefit returns when compared to strategies based on 
defence (UNEP, 2016; CCC, 2013).  
However, limitations are also recognised. The unpopularity of MR with the public and the 
consequential reluctance of government officials, elected or responsible to those elected 
(often faced also with the loss of local tax revenue from the cleared areas), can discourage 
implementation (Linham and Nicholls, 2010; IPCC, 2013, 2014; CIWEM, 2006). Another 
constraint is the generally high cost to taxpayers of MR should it be government funded: 
compensation for those relocated needs to be adequate to encourage cooperation yet full 
cooperation is very expensive (CIWEM, 2006; Daniel, 2001). Land, infrastructure and 
                                                        
3 https://uk.pinterest.com/pin/268316090270852494/ 
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property values in intensively urbanized coastal zones (e.g. Manhattan and similar cities) may 
render retreat especially expensive and therefore unviable there (Linham and Nicholls, 2010, 
UNEP, 2016). 
3. Methodology 
Our research question was whether MR can be a feasible adaptation strategy in 
flood-vulnerable high-risk areas, and under which conditions. Data collection at Staten Island 
occurred in June and July 2015, nearly three years after Sandy but when the MR process was 
still very active and memories of the disaster were still very fresh.  
We used three complementary methods: literature analysis, semi-structured stakeholder 
interviews, and one focus group
4
. The research design was what is termed purposeful: we 
have not sought a representative sample of all actors, but have followed the guidance from 
Palinkas et al (2015, 533) that “(such) purposeful sampling is widely used ….. for the 
identification and selection of information-rich cases related to the phenomenon of interest”. 
All our participants had a great deal of MR relevant information to share with us, thereby 
illuminating the key issues from both their organisations‟ and the residents‟ standpoints. We 
see consensus there as indicative of the likely consensus in their communities. We know that 
these are bold assumptions, but ones that we feel are justified by the match between their 
information and that from our analysis of the relevant grey and formal literature.  
Our interview questions and focus group topics were developed after identifying four key but 
interrelated Sandy-relevant themes in the established hazards literature: the effect of Sandy 
on attitudes to risk, reactions and response (see White,1960; Kates,1962; Bukvic et al,2015); 
the viability of a longer term plan and strategy (see Albrechts,2004; Esteves,2014); 
development in hazard prone areas (see Tobin,1995; Parker,1995); and public engagement 
and incentives for MR (see Alexander,2012; De Vries and Fraser,2012). Discussing each 
theme with our participants involved them looking back at their experience of Sandy on 
Staten Island and forward to future MR programs both there and elsewhere. 
Fourteen semi-structured interviews (Table 1) allowed participants to elaborate on topics of 
concern to them and, where relevant, to their institutions. We chose interviewees from what 
we see as key stakeholder and commentator categories across the decision-making spectrum: 
government; non-profit agencies; community leaders/members; academia. Individuals were 
selected following web and other searches based on two criteria: their personal Sandy 
experiences and their role in post-Sandy operations. Interviewees were approached by email, 
with a consent form and an overview of discussion topics. The 45 to 90 minute interviews 
were fully transcribed for review by individual interviewees, two of whom then provided 
additional information. 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 All data gathering on Staten Island was undertaken by the 1st author, who moderated the focus group. 
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Table 1. Interviewees and their roles (interviews: June 17 to July 28 2015) with participants 
labelled I1 to I14 cited in the text 
 
Through the two-hour focus group we explored ideas and opinions in a more discursive 
manner, focused around eight pre-determined statements concerning the four themes as 
particularised for Staten Island through our interviews (Table 2). The process yielded 
qualitative and quantitative data, the former recorded throughout the discussions and used via 
our systematic transcript review to identify common and stakeholder relevant themes 
complementing our other information (Carey and Asbury, 2012). Selection for the group 
required voluntary participation and existing knowledge of or experience with MR on Staten 
Island and NYS/NYC interactions.  
We did not seek a homogenous group, which we recognise as general focus group practice 
(Morgan, 1997). Instead we used an equal representation of buyout community leaders for 
their local insights and academic resilience specialists to tap into wider issues, so as to 
explore the interrelations and differences between the two inputs. The community leaders 
constituted two from Ocean Breeze and one from Oakwood Beach. While the MR process 
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was active our focus was on these community leaders, who indicated reaching out to 
individual householders would be an extremely difficult undertaking. Those that had 
successfully negotiated agreements with NYS for a buy-out had moved out of the area and 
those still in the buyout process were bound by non-disclosure regulations as stipulated by the 
terms of the buyout agreement. Finally, the holdouts, largely frustrated and emotionally 
exhausted in the Sandy aftermath, were either unwilling, unavailable or unidentifiable during 
the data collection phase. The academics involved two College of Staten Island professors, 
one Science/Physics, one Finance and Economics, plus one researcher of social aspects post 
Sandy. To complement the qualitative data a confidentially deployed Likert scale (Trochim, 
2006) captured individual attitude patterns quantitatively, for comparison with the interview 
findings. 
Table 2. Focus Group Quantitative Findings with participants labelled FG1 to FG6 cited in 
the text 
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While anxiety generating events such as buyout programs are in full swing, research such as 
reported here can be problematic. For example, some of the relevant terminology (“setback”; 
“retreat”; etc) may precipitate antagonism, and some invitation non-response was inevitable 
(although < 3 individuals). However our relatively small sample sizes, though not unusual in 
qualitative research, appear sufficient to capture most attitudes and relevant information. Our 
confidence here results from the many matches seen in our data with the results of our 
analysis of the very extensive documentary and media information from the aftermath of 
Sandy and since. The research sought to be as objective as possible, helped by the three 
complementary data sources. But the findings are the - subjective - opinions and feelings of 
our participants and these dominate the character of this paper.  
4. The Geographical, Social and Policy Context 
4.1 Staten Island Flooding and its Socio-political Context 
Hurricane Sandy (29.10.2012) had a significant impact on the New York (NY) region, 
especially on Staten Island (Knafo and Shapiro, 2012; NPCC, 2010; Benimoff et al, 2015; 
Gornitz et al, 2001). Some 16% of the Borough was flooded, impacting approximately 
76,000 residents
5
. Ocean Breeze, Graham Beach and Oakwood Beach all suffered badly. 
Damage in the State amounted to $32bn
6
 with Staten Island accounting for 23 percent of 
NYC damaged properties
7
. 
While events of this magnitude are rare, hurricanes in 1932 and 1938 had produced 4.0-6.0m 
storm surge heights but the associated flooding went largely unnoticed: the majority of Staten 
Island‟s coastal areas then were undeveloped marshlands (Benimoff et al, 2015)8. These areas, 
largely at mean sea level, buffered incoming surges. Since then continuous urbanisation has 
placed large numbers of houses at risk (Benimoff, 2010).  
Socio-politically, most Staten Islanders have strenuously sought independence from external 
influence (see Kramer and Flanagan, 2012). They have generally voted Republican (40% for 
Clinton and 57% for Trump in 2016, with Trump at 75% on flood-vulnerable South Shore
9
). 
Predominantly white working or lower middle-class owner occupiers with many years of 
residency (Binder et al (2015) they have sought and still seek to minimise government 
interference. Until Sandy, a manifestation of such independence, according to Kramer and 
Flanagan (2012), was the lack of coherent spatial planning and building code compliance 
here, and the generally unchecked development in the low-lying coastal areas.  
Not until 1964 was Staten Island connected to Brooklyn via the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge 
(Barron, 2014), leading to substantial settlement on the Eastern and Southern beaches which 
until then were predominantly inexpensive summer communities with single-storey 
                                                        
5 http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/hurricane-sandy/hurricane-sandy-year-staten-island-article-1.1494052 
6 Library, C. N. N. "Hurricane Sandy Fast Facts - CNN.com". CNN. Retrieved 2016-10-27. 
7 http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/downloads/pdf/final_report/Ch15_Staten_Island_FINAL_singles.pdf 
8http://www.historicmapworks.com/Map/US/39402/Historical+Geology+Sheet+003+++New+Jersey+++New+
York+Staten+Island+Quadrangle/New+York+City+1902+Geological+Atlas+of+the+United+States+Vol+83/Ne
w+York/ 
9 http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/11/heres_how_donald_trump_fared_o.html 
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properties (Benimoff, 2010). Many such temporary homes that were upgraded and winterised 
as all-year dwellings were wrecked by Sandy. 
4.2 The Buyout and Acquisition Programs (NYS) 
In targeting potential buyout areas generally, U.S. government agencies identify highest-risk 
properties based on repetitive losses (Siders, 2013; NWF, 1998). This reduces insurance 
claims, particularly relevant where insurance programs are public, such as the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency‟s (FEMA‟s) U.S. National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). 
Technically, FEMA can require buyouts of properties damaged and losing more than 50% of 
their pre-flood values
10
, but they do not typically do this, for many reasons, with the 
unacceptability of mandated retreat “from above”, being an important one. 
Managed retreat after Sandy was implemented by a series of buyout initiatives. In terms of 
policy and related government intervention, several property acquisition programs were 
available in the region, with eligibility depending on significant Sandy-related damages and 
property location. In January 2013, U.S. Congress made disaster recovery funding available 
to various regional authorities, including authorisation for property acquisitions or buyouts 
(NYS GOSR(1), 2014) for “properties located in the floodplain (and) intended to reduce risk 
from future flooding” (U.S. Congress, 2013, 14345). New York State (NYS) promoted MR as 
an adaptation strategy. Both buyout and acquisition programs were offered (NYS GOSR(1), 
2014). The acquisitions program used post-storm property values, with additional housing 
assistance, whereas the buyout program used pre-storm values and additional incentives 
depending on individual circumstances. 
The buyout program - our research focus - had a distinct environmental and resiliency 
component, prohibiting future development in perpetuity: the vacated land can only be used 
for open space, recreation or wetland restoration (NYS GOSR (1), 2014). The acquisitions 
program allows for new or upgrading property, and is perceived by many as a redevelopment 
scheme. The policies were flexible, reflecting local differences. Targeted buyout was an 
attempt by NYS to purchase groups of adjacent properties, in a predetermined location, to 
restore natural conditions (NYS GOSR (1), 2014) and minimise the problems inherent in 
“holdouts”. 
Eleven applications were received from communities for the NYS Buyout program, but only 
three were accepted for enhanced buyout status: Oakwood Beach, Ocean Breeze and Graham 
Beach (I4
11
) (Figure 1) (NYS GOSR (2) 23014). NY State Governor Cuomo allowed 
homeowners in the enhanced buyout zones to claim a 10% premium over pre-storm values. 
Eligibility involved properties being situated in FEMA designated 1:100yr flood zones (State 
of New York, 2015).  
With strong community support, and a strong champion recommending buyout 
12
, this 
became a large program. Oakwood Beach was first in line; 99% of homeowners there 
                                                        
10 http://www.clm.com/publication.cfm?ID=424#_edn2 
11 i.e. interviewee No. 4; interviewee numbers are given in Table 1. 
12http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20141020/REAL_ESTATE/310199992/oakwood-beach-sell-out-tear-do
wn-and-leave Accessed 28.12.16. 
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submitted buyout applications by 2016. The government spent $301 million here, acquiring 
296 out of a targeted 326 properties (Freudenberg et al, 2016). By 2016, 60 homes had been 
demolished (Freudenberg et al 2016). In 2014, buyout programs were also approved at 
Graham Beach and Ocean Breeze, promoted by local champions and the support of the 
Oakwood Beach protagonist, each with 130 homes planned for purchase (New York 
Government, 2014). In the program overall, 679 homes were eligible for enhanced buyout (I4) 
and 350 homeowners had quickly settled by June 2015. The final total of properties 
purchased remains confidential but large areas were guaranteed to be „returned to nature‟ 
(NYS GOSR(1), 2014). 
4.3 The Adjacent Build-it-Back (NYC) and the Blue Acres Buyout (NJ) Programs 
Our research focused on the NYS buyout program, but alternatives nearby almost certainly 
affected attitudes to any potential buyout program by showing what MR arrangements were 
possible. New York City, while acknowledging its increased vulnerability, insisted retreat was 
not an option. Their Build-It-Back program enabled low income households to sell their 
homes to the City. Properties would be rebuilt or reinforced against coastal flooding (Baussan 
and Peterson, 2015), with mandatory new elevation levels and resilient materials (NYC, 
2015a). The program appears to have been slow in its implementation procedures and heavily 
criticised publically (NYC, 2015b).  
In adjacent New Jersey (NJ) the Green Acres Program can acquire privately-held land for 
environmental gain. The Blue Acres project, as part of Green Acres, provides an acquisition 
option for properties “damaged by … storms or storm-related flooding” (NJ DEP (1), 2015, 
1). But voluntary buyouts after extensive flooding here from Hurricanes Floyd (1999) and 
Irene (2011) had been limited by budgetary constraints: demand here far exceeded the 
funding and political support from municipalities and the State government. After Sandy, 
however, this also became a large program (NJ (DEP) (2) 2015; NJ (DEP) (3) 2015), 
acquiring more than 500 homes
13
.  
At least two potential successes therefore rapidly emerged after Sandy: Oakwood Beach and 
nearby Blue Acres (above, in NYS and NJ). A paradox arises here regarding the Staten 
Islanders‟ reliance on funding and state support and their strongly independent identity and 
aspirations. The success of such public interventions would appear to require strong levels of 
public engagement, consensus and good relationships between residents and government in 
its various forms (Siders, 2013). On Staten Island, that level of multi-party engagement or 
Rousseau-type social contract was not only largely absent before Sandy, but very far beyond 
the „comfort zone‟ of the average homeowner (again, see Kramer and Flanagan (2012)). This 
was an important context for our research. 
5. Our Findings: Managed Retreat Explored As a Social Process 
We present the key issues related to voluntarily agreed community level MR here in terms of 
the four themes outlines above using the findings from our focus group and interviews. 
                                                        
13 http://barnegatlighttaxpayer.org/since-sandy-500-nj-properties-acquired-through-blue-acres-buyout-program/ 
Accessed 28.12.16 
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5.1 Theme 1: Risk and Reactions 
Comprehensive MR - without leaving too many “hold-outs” as residual isolated 
vulnerabilities - required consensual thinking. Starting at Oakwood Beach but spreading to 
our two other areas (and elsewhere), local communities came together to seek state funded 
property buyouts, with little initial local (NYC) support. A key issue revealed here is that MR 
as on Staten Island - unfortunately - is only feasible (and would only be likely elsewhere) if 
implemented in the wake of a disaster and the risks thereby revealed.  
Our focus group‟s Topic 3 (Table 2) explored support for this „window of opportunity‟ 
concept. We found strong insistence, without dissent, that a major disaster was necessary to 
trigger the required momentum and sense of urgency for the implementation of adaptation 
strategies on Staten Island (implicitly including buyout). The community representatives 
were sceptical of the timing of buyout programs and its effect on success, but “If you can get 
the answers quicker (after a disaster), people make better decisions” (FG3). If authorities wait 
too long with their offers and their conditions, the initial shock wears off, the water recedes 
and people are reminded of all the good reasons why they were living in this unfortunately 
high-flood prone area. If the initiatives take too long to mobilize, people change their minds 
and want to stay, making the potential success of the buyout program more unlikely, due to a 
larger number of holdouts.  
Our interviewees agreed. A general view here was that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
generate the necessary social, political and economic momentum for MR programs as a norm 
without an actual disaster. None endorsed the notion that the general focus on adaptation in 
the New York region at that time - and related funding - would have been possible without 
Sandy. The academic and government interviewees were more specific. They acknowledged 
the inability of the current political process to generate sufficient support for high impact 
programs like MR in absence of a trigger event (I4; I5; I7; I10). The momentum to act is 
short-lived and society collectively forgets and moves on (I7). Despite the existence of a 
buyout program, if the period between the storm and the conclusion of buyouts is too long, 
community members gradually start to change their minds (I13).  
The community interviewees offered a complementary local perspective. Sandy was not the 
single reason for the success of the MR program: repetitive flooding and brushfires over 
many years had pushed many residents into considering their options (I13). But there was a 
balance to be struck: the buyout communities were seen by many as highly desirable places 
in which to live. Proximity to the beach and the tranquility of living in the wetlands within 
the NYC area at a reasonable cost and - initially - with low insurance premiums far 
outweighed the drawbacks of repetitive flooding, prior to Sandy (I2; I11; I13). However, after 
just finishing repairs from Hurricanes Lee and Irene, Sandy was the “last straw”: there is a 
certain amount of personal drama that people can endure, before they reach a point of drastic 
decisions, like giving up their homes (I2, I9, I4).  
Without a major trigger event a large majority in the focus group did not have confidence that 
adaptation considerations, particularly socially disruptive buyout programs, would surface on 
to political agendas or even into the public consciousness (Table 2, topic 3). Regarding MR, 
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participants were more specific, firmly supporting the triggering process. “It does not matter 
how smart or how right you are, when it comes to where people live and property values 
(after a disaster), everything else goes out the window” (FG5). “Nobody would listen to you 
(before Sandy)” (FG4) and “crisis du jour” was the driver for a consensus and for change 
(FG6).  
Exploring whether the post-disaster situation triggered more radical policies, the use of 
eminent domain (compulsory purchase) was universally dismissed by our interviewees as an 
undesirable or impractical retreat strategy: all available buyout and 
acquisitions-for-redevelopment programs in place in the NY region are on a voluntary basis 
(I4; I5; I7; I12). Additionally, eminent domain would conflict with the use of Federal 
emergency funding and thus is not an option in a post-disaster scenario (I2, I14). Antagonism 
to vacating private properties without an imminent threat would apply to both government 
and residents alike (I2, I4, I5, I7, I10). “People want to be left alone and you are not going to 
get them to pick up and go, unless there is a danger that forces them to change their lifestyle” 
(I10).  
There are always options, and to tackle the legacy from past poor decisions one alternative to 
waiting for a disaster is a permanently available buyout program (Table 2, Topic 4). 
Unanimous focus group member support here may appear contradictory, given their 
insistence on a disaster as a trigger, but the academics and residents alike supported residents 
having options, should they decide to be bought out and leave, even though aware of the 
governmental budgetary constraints that limit buyouts.  
Our interviewees were more divided. NYC officials emphasized housing stock needs 
(hindered by retreat and the consequential property demolition) and the value of their 
Acquisitions for Redevelopment “Build it Back” program (I5,I7). NYS officials were worried 
about on-going large funding requirements, when considering scaling up MR programs (I4). 
Without an immediate need with a major disaster, our NYC and NJ officials affirmed that no 
Federal Emergency Funds would be available, which makes permanent retreat programs less 
viable (I5, I7, I14). Available funding rises ten-fold in post-disaster scenarios and the 
US$300m Federal dollars committed towards New Jersey state-wide buyouts (I14) would not 
have been available, without Sandy, for proactive initiatives. Planning for resilience measures, 
long-term, comes with the virtual certainty of significantly less finance, especially for 
buyouts (I7). 
The timeline difference between disaster recovery plans and political office terms was also 
seen (I5) to remove the urgency for politicians proactively to introduce such impactful topics 
as MR within resiliency planning: the majority of MR‟s resilience benefits will occur far 
beyond political office timescales, yet all the public expense and effort is needed “up front” 
in the short term.  
We see these findings as amply illustrating the well-known risk-response phenomenon: 
disasters are the principal drivers of the economic, financial, social and political consensus 
and momentum necessary to trigger policy or attitudinal change, whether such change is 
incremental over many years (Albrechts, 2004) or catalyst-driven by single events (Johnson 
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et al., 2005). In the case of buyouts, these are unpopular amongst those householders affected, 
and only a major event provides the window of opportunity, the resources and the 
individual‟s motivation for them to surface as real options. 
5.2 The Theme 2: Long-term Planning, Strategy and Benefits 
The feasibility of MR may improve if alternatives are seen as less viable by those affected 
and, additionally, if MR is part of a comprehensive long-term plan relevant to both disaster 
and non-disaster situations. Our focus group‟s Topic 6 (Table 2) was used to gauge opinion 
about one alternative in the form of the publically announced seawall plan for protecting part 
of the Island from flooding
14
, and to appreciate how people evaluate different options: here 
engineering-dominated solutions versus retreat strategies (with any necessary engineering 
component). Discussing interactions between the two, the possibility of buyout participation 
rates being negatively affected by the seawall announcement was dismissed by the group‟s 
community members as irrelevant due to the major uncertainty regarding its actual 
implementation. 
This seawall discussion nevertheless highlighted various perspectives. Firstly, the cost-benefit 
analysis was seen by the academics in the group to produce a favourable verdict here, when 
compared to MR. Costing US$580m (estimated), the seawall could protect approximately 
11,000 households. With 350 buyouts costing US$140m (the numbers then available), buyout 
is significantly more expensive per dwelling. There is a steep premium to be paid for 
complete risk reduction - the buyout program - versus the “acceptable risk reduction” option - 
the seawall. Of course, this comparison promoted discussion on what constitutes acceptable 
in terms of human casualties related to the residual risk with the seawall and its finite cost: 
benefit driven design standard; the seawall was seen here to have limitations, and might in 
any case never be funded. 
Secondly, the seawall was projected to produce a false sense of security, reduce flood 
insurance rates behind the wall and make living in the area more attractive: development 
therefore would accelerate, placing more homes in the floodplain (I6). Without strong 
policies that control development, as virtually nonexistent on Staten Island in the past, such 
protection schemes could have a detrimental long-term effect on a region‟s resilience, 
reducing the perceived threat of extreme weather events and hampering any necessary 
disaster driven evacuation efforts (I6).  
Thirdly, all of our community members, as interviewees and in the focus group, were 
skeptical regarding the likelihood of the seawall ever being built. Seawall discussions have 
been ongoing on Staten Island for more than 30 years and despite numerous government 
indications about feasibility and necessity, the wall has never materialised. Those attitudes 
appeared to be illustrative of some strained or non-existent relationships between Staten 
Islanders and the government, in this case the U.S. Corps of Engineers.  
There are other coastal risk reduction alternatives, and focus group Topic 8 (Table 2) 
                                                        
14http://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2015/08/20/army-corps-of-engineers-shares-plans-for-seawall-on-
staten-island-s-east-shore.html Accessed 29.12.16 
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reviewed longer term prospects. This produced not only very strong statements of 
non-confidence in Staten Island‟s current short-term and long-term planning capabilities but 
also invoked a wave of emotion and criticism directed at government in general. That NYC‟s 
Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was bypassed completely after Sandy incited the 
focus group participants, particularly in the absence of other arrangements. Illustrative of the 
level of public frustration, the controversy surrounding the 2012 NYC marathon, scheduled 
for five days after Sandy but cancelled at the eleventh hour, touched at the heart of the issue. 
While Staten Islanders were reeling from the storm, NYC decreed that the mobile 
„Port-a-Johns‟ toilets for the runners were not for use by Sandy victims, identifying for 
members of our group a serious disconnect between government authorities and residents. 
The inability to deploy some form of „disaster and recovery playbook‟15, providing guidelines, 
structures and best practices to enhance recovery in disaster-impacted communities, was 
heavily criticised by all our participants. Planning and plans were uniformly distrusted.  
But a seawall versus a MR plan or other alternatives was seen as too simplistic; MR would 
always need to be part of a larger adaptation strategy (I1,I4,I5,I7,I12). This is partially due to 
budgetary constraints surrounding retreat, given its expense, but also practicality and the 
feasibility of implementation. That only three of the eleven communities applying for the 
NYS Buyout Program were selected was cited as an example (I4). The other eight 
communities were assessed on the same range of criteria, including elevation above sea level 
and inundation during Sandy (I4), but instead they were designated for redevelopment or 
property elevation programs. Managed retreat was too expensive and too difficult to be 
applied everywhere: NYS simply did not have sufficient resources.  
The NYS officials interviewed (I4) suggested that their response to Sandy has been reactive 
but also forward looking. The engagement of communities was the result of the storm, but it 
was aimed at being better prepared for the future: “It is about building back better 
(elsewhere)” (I4). Furthermore, the officials emphasised that their restricted deed on buyout 
property lots was a key factor for many homeowners. The fact that an individual sacrifice 
would benefit future generations by vacating land, recreating wetlands, and thereby 
increasing overall resilience of Staten Island was an important driver behind the success of 
the NYS buyout program (I4). 
The general consensus with our interviewees is that buyout cannot operate effectively without 
post-disaster funding and momentum and that long term programs are often supported, but 
are problematic to implement. But value was nevertheless seen in maintaining long-term 
buyout programs: their strength lies in the framework and capacity put in place during 
non-disaster times (I1,I5,I11,I12,I14); they support officials who later want to act on 
post-disaster momentum by implementing resilience strategies, including the buyout option 
(I1,I14). They promote awareness of MR and an opportunity for homeowners to seek buyout 
at a less stressful time.  
Blue Acres was cited as a potential template in the NY region, and possibly nationwide 
                                                        
15 http://disasterrecoveryplaybook.org/home.html 
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(I5,I11,I12). Not heavily promoted before Sandy, the program then provided a pre-existing 
conduit for incoming funds and operated more efficiently than would any new initiative 
(I12,I14). Asked if the efficiency of spending Federal funds for MR programs increased with 
an existing vehicle in place, the NJ official replied: “Oh yes, 100%. 100%!” (I14). A disaster 
catalyzes an existing process. 
Buyout programs were therefore seen to require a complementary overall strategy. The need 
for long-term resilience planning for Staten Island and the New York region was clear from 
all the interviews and at the focus group. How to achieve it was far less clear. “Shame on 
New York City, because we did not have a better plan! We have OEM (Office of Emergency 
Management) and several thousands of people on staff, but we did not have anybody to deal 
with this (Sandy) scenario” (I13).  
We see these Staten Island findings as an indication that successful MR as an adaptation tool 
is likely to depend on the mix and viability of other feasible strategies available. More often 
than not, other adaptation tools may be more suitable and feasible. Buying out an entire 
neighbourhood might be viable for smaller, less populated communities, where all risk can be 
mitigated with a single buyout plan (as I7 suggested). The reality of NYC - and its density of 
houses and people - may suggest more efficient ways to invest in risk mitigation, keeping 
urban communities in the floodplain, beginning a dialogue with communities about their risk 
and finding ways to strengthen their resilience in future through protective or accommodating 
measures (favoured by I5,I7). Such long term resilience planning will require difficult 
decisions, meaning that in some neighbourhoods an effective and permanent buyout program 
will be the best way forward (I12). In other places a better decision may be to build flood 
defences (I12). Nothing is clear-cut, nor is success guaranteed, especially where antipathy is 
common - as on Staten Island - towards planning per se. 
5.3 Theme 3: Development in Floodplains 
We explored here whether the feasibility of MR improves if policies are in place restricting 
subsequent development in flood-vulnerable areas and the people whose homes will be 
demolished can judge that the legacy of unwise decisions in the past is being addressed.  
Here we saw significant participant disagreement. Our interviewees suggested that economic 
opportunity tends to conflict with responsible development. NYC has a responsibility to 
determine and direct growth within the city (I5). In that sense, long-term planning and related 
zoning are important. However, as a tool to control development, zoning can be limited in its 
effectiveness: if zoning strictures are not endorsed by developers and supported by the market, 
envisioned planning objectives will go by the wayside (I5). What further complicates matters 
is that development is such a slow-moving process. Urbanization levels on Staten Island had 
doubled between 1960 and 1980, but before that development happened one dwelling at a 
time, so encroachment of risky areas within the 100-year floodplain was largely hidden.  
Many U.S. regulations regarding wetlands protection and responsible building standards in 
floodplains also date only from the 1980s and many of the most vulnerable houses in the 
floodplain on the Island‟s Eastern shore predate those regulations; they were “grandfathered 
Environmental Management and Sustainable Development 
ISSN 2164-7682 
2018, Vol. 7, No. 2 
http://emsd.macrothink.org 123 
in” and never required to comply with the new regime (I13). Our interviewees indicated that 
many residents stated they were misinformed about flood insurance requirements and the 
flood zone was very rarely a consideration in purchasing houses in the area, despite publicly 
available information showing a 1:100 year floodplain. The relevant properties were never 
meant to be lived in year-round, and were hit hard during Sandy (I4,I7). In reality, planning 
was non-existent on Staten Island for many years and the residents (not unhappy with this) 
were at the mercy of local officials seeking locations for development and developers seeking 
strong ties with local government officials (I13). A booming population and a perpetual 
housing shortage in NYC provides a likely explanation why some of the Staten Island 
communities have been built in such vulnerable locations, based often on poor or partial risk 
information. 
Compromises now were favoured by some interviewees. The pressure now to accommodate a 
growing NYC population makes large-scale buyout programs undesirable as well as 
financially impossible. That fuels redevelopment programs at the expense of MR programs. 
The ultimate NYC objective is to maintain levels of available and affordable housing, while 
using the momentum from Sandy to upgrade to a more resilient housing stock (I5), even if 
that means maintaining residences and infrastructure in risky, flood-vulnerable areas.  
Our focus group Topic 1 (Table 2) sought to provoke discussion on the level of control that 
governments can and should exercise over development processes. However, the discussion 
was somewhat unfocused, due to different interpretations of the inevitability of incremental 
development in flood-prone areas. Some participants interpreted it using the current situation 
and looking forward, whereas others approached the theme historically (perhaps not wanting 
to discuss the future). Both discussions did however reflect a frustration with a development 
process that apparently cannot be controlled here, neither by educating people nor even in the 
wake of a major storm event.  
The academic in strong disagreement with the apparent inevitability of lack of control over 
development emphasised that proper education about flood zones and evacuation routes will 
make a difference and enhance resilience. However, the community members disagreed: 
education alone will not suffice. “You can educate them all you want, but when it comes to 
money, it is not going to make a difference”(FG5). There was some agreement that the 
government has a role to play in mandating the private sector to incorporate flood damage 
disclosure on real estate transactions and in restricting building approvals in high-risk areas. 
However, no focus group participant was convinced that governments can successfully 
overcome their political ties to the real estate and building community on Staten Island.   
Similar sentiments, regarding the role of government and the lack of regulatory enforcement, 
were worded even more strongly in some of our interviews. All of the community leaders 
indicated that some of the development in their respective communities should probably 
never have happened (I2,I9,I10,I13). However, the fault was not with the homeowners, but 
with local elected officials who approved the development (I13) and failed to enforce 
building standards and environmental requirements of building in or near the wetlands (I2). 
Without collectively agreed standards individuals are at risk of making unwise decisions. 
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It was again stressed that the development of the most vulnerable communities was a slow, 
incremental process. Beach communities were upgraded long before building and flood zone 
standards were enforced (I2,I4,I5,I7,I9,I13). However, that did not mean that these 
communities should never have been built, but there should have been stricter governmental 
enforcement once people started using their homes year-round (I13). Even with retreat 
programs, thanks to sea level rise we will always be close to the water and flood risk will not 
disappear. The focus should be on how that risk can be reduced to what they saw as 
acceptable levels, difficult though these were to define (I7). 
The consensus was that what they saw as Staten Island overdevelopment has occurred due to 
lack of oversight (I2). Not only have local officials failed to control development in low-lying 
floodplains, they have actively encouraged it in exchange for political support (I2,I9). Various 
NYC officials and agencies pursued conflicting interests. As environmental agencies were 
using wetlands as part of Staten Island‟s BlueBelt stormwater reduction program16, local 
Staten Island officials were issuing building permits in those same, now vulnerable, areas (I2). 
With better coordination amongst agencies and the right planning policies, urbanisation on 
Staten Island‟s Eastern shore could have been restricted. The perceived continuing absence of 
inter-agency coordination was seen as further fueling the communities‟ distrust of 
government interventions. 
Looking forward, there was less agreement, mainly about feasibility. To persuade 
communities to participate in buyouts, for some general good, policies need to be introduced 
and enforced to prevent the historic overdevelopment from happening in the future (I12)(see 
also Koslov,2016). All tools at our disposal to promote and incentivise responsible 
development in the future were seen to be needed. This included stricter zoning regulations, 
compliance with resilience and flood standards for new construction, removal of legal 
barriers to facilitate resilience compliance and greater capacity within oversight authorities. 
Only in the context of that level of commitment to area development, could MR be 
successfully introduced as a resilience measure to tackle legacy areas where vulnerability is 
demonstrably high.  
We judge, however, that this way forward may be a huge challenge, considering rebuilding 
had already started in locations that were wiped out during Sandy (reported by community 
interviewees I2, I9, I13). At the time of our research construction was ongoing in sections of 
Ocean Breeze, which was hit particularly hard: As one community focus group participant 
remarked “Another storm is needed to stop the development in this high-risk, 
flood-vulnerable zone” (FG5).  
5.4 Theme 4: Public Engagement, Transparency and Incentives 
Managed retreat may become more feasible if residents can be properly incentivised, 
including through full transparency and public engagement before, during and after a disaster. 
However, there are research process issues here. Because of the emotional personal 
experiences and prolonged trauma that residents were still experiencing in Sandy-damaged 
                                                        
16 http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/dep_projects/bluebelt.shtml accessed 21.12.16. 
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communities at the time of our data gathering, it unsurprisingly proved difficult to get an 
unemotional view from community members interviewed on several issues involving 
long-term recovery. Their focus tended still to be on the short-term emergency (I9, I13). 
Local community-based aid organisations, advocacy groups and academics were able to 
provide more detached but perhaps less „real world‟ opinions (I3; I11), both about the 
community response and the level of government engagement. Residents and government 
officials were quite possibly too close to either end of the governed/government spectrum to 
be able to offer a truly objective response (whatever that might be in the circumstances). 
Notwithstanding this, there was strong majority view in our focus group - topic 2 (Table 2) - 
that relationship-building between governments and communities needs to happen in 
non-disaster (i.e. pre-disaster) situations, as part of disaster prepreparedness. Two issues were 
critical here: the lack of government capacity and knowledge to act after Sandy and the 
resulting communication failures. Federal, State and City governments did not have a clear 
vision, and in absence of any formal direction communities started mobilising themselves and 
putting pressure on local officials. Thus initially the response was „bottom-up‟. There was a 
collective disbelief in our group concerning the lack of preparedness and leadership amongst 
these local officials, despite the apparent availability of the NYC emergency handbook. That 
disbelief fueled sentiments of general group distrust of the government, which led to 
accusations that internal relationships and political affiliations between various levels of 
government were to blame for a complete communications and operations failure on Staten 
Island during and after the disaster. 
Communities were in need of increased government assistance - and felt that they had been 
given promises - but were unable to access it (I3,I8). On the NYS level, residents felt that the 
Buyout Program did not include as many communities as they had hoped would be helped, 
leading to disillusion. From a long-term planning perspective, it seemed counterintuitive that 
one community would be bought out and returned to nature, while the adjacent community 
would be redeveloped. Our NYS interviewee pointed out, however, that despite the majority 
of applying communities being part of the same floodplain, this did not translate into a 
similar risk profile or strategy: “This is not an apples-to-apples comparison” (I4).  
On the NYC level, interviewees indicated that people felt disrespected and inhumanely 
treated by the Build-it-Back Program, which in their eyes was overly bureaucratic and 
disorganised (I3). We found near unanimous negative feedback from our Staten Island 
interviewees and focus group concerning this program, reinforcing the existing distrust there 
of governments and their programs. Many community-based initiatives had therefore sprung 
up in response to Sandy. This was attributed to strong social cohesion within the community, 
but also partially because of the apparent lack of immediate government support needed „on 
the ground‟ (I3, I8). However, it was accepted that local initiatives could never replace 
large-scale government programs necessary for long-term recovery.  
The need for stronger local capacity was acknowledged by all interviewees. Strong regional 
planning relies heavily on strong local capacity (I1). Both NYC and NYS officials confirmed 
the need for more active public engagement during non-disaster times: these conversations 
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should not be occurring immediately following disasters. Instead a plan of action needs to be 
in place and communicated well before any event (I4, I5). Investments in social infrastructure 
should take precedence over investments in physical infrastructure (I6). The NYS officials 
highlighted an existing effort - the Community Reconstruction Program - to identify local 
resilience projects, using community-based expertise (I4). An example cited was the Staten 
Island Alliance
17
 born in the aftermath of Sandy and becoming a central hub in the Ocean 
Breeze community (I13). 
However, our interviewees indicated that this debate is not straightforward. They considered 
that the value of public engagement and the possibility of incentivising people to make wiser 
decisions came down, in essence, to two considerations: the extent to which people are 
capable of placing collective interests - such as, here, towards wetland conservation and its 
risk-reducing implications - above individual homeowner interests, and the level of 
expectations regarding government assistance in post-disaster situations. The seemingly 
inherent skepticism of Staten Islanders of any type of government intervention alienates both 
parties and strains communication efforts. One of the academic interviewees reflected that “It 
is just a process that in general Staten Islanders have so little familiarity and comfort with. 
Even under the best circumstances it is going to be difficult because they don‟t interact with 
government bureaucracy. They need somebody to help them, you need an 
inter-communicator” (I11). Faulty information was said to have been distributed to many 
residents in the immediate aftermath of the storm (I3, I8, I13). “Mistakes were still being 
made, because people don‟t see the next step” (I8). That led to confusion amongst residents. 
It highlighted the need for short-term considerations, while planning for the long-term (I11). 
Major disasters were seen to expose governance vulnerabilities further feeding the 
community‟s inherent dislike of government intervention. To overcome this distrust, 
strengthening of permanent relationships with local civic organisations in non-disaster times 
is what needs to happen to increase participation in future government programming (I4,I5), 
particularly for measures as impactful as MR. Transparency in communication, even if that 
means conveying confrontational messages, is essential. People should know and understand 
their risks (I12). This is also the basis for NYC‟s planned efforts moving forward: engaging 
communities about risk and developing ways to mitigate that risk (I7). Alongside that level of 
transparency, government programming should provide residents with options for managing 
those risks. One of those should be a year-round buyout program (I12). 
However, we infer from these findings that transparency and communication may well be 
necessary but perhaps is not sufficient: local leadership appears also a fundamental 
requirement. It cannot be a coincidence that successful buyout proposals came from 
communities with strong existing community associations or community leaders. The 
Oakwood Beach Buyout Program has received public praise for being community-driven 
with high buy-in and a short implementation timeframe. Many conditions had to align for that 
program to be successful (I2). This included a number of qualified contributors, including 
community leaders with real estate experience who had the knowledge and time to see the 
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process through and advise residents. Key contacts in upstate NY and Tennessee were also 
contacted for their knowledge of buyout programs. The Oakwood Beach „92 Committee, 
formed after major flooding in 1992, had been advocating flood protection for more than 20 
years
18
. Finally, Governor Cuomo - a crucial player promoting buyout (Rush,2015; 
Koslov,2016) - had a familiarity with the workings of the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), the funding agency (I2). Anticipating this familiarity, the „92 
Committee was able rapidly to present the Governor‟s Office with a HUD-conforming 
buyout proposal embodying limited associated political risk for local officials. A similar 
community cohesion and structure in place in Ocean Breeze appears there also to have 
boosted the potential feasibility and success of MR.  
6. Assessment and Conclusions: A dismal prognosis? 
In illustrating that managed retreat can be a feasible adaptation strategy in flood threatened 
coastal areas we believe our Staten Island findings are virtually unique (see the global 
analysis by Hino et al, 2017). With leadership, success has been achieved here at a large scale 
and, paradoxically, despite general support for the necessary government sponsored 
intervention being at a very low level.  
However, we judge there are very significant political impediments as well as financial 
constraints to such programs being successful without a prior disaster as part of a repetitive 
sequence of hazardous events. Even then the likely requirements for successful 
implementation are numerous and demanding (Table 3) - and the MR we found at Staten 
Island was described as a “miracle” by one focus group community member (FG4) - but such 
requirements have been seemingly ignored by numerous MR advocates such as the OECD 
(2010), UNEP (2010), UNU-IHDP (2015) and the World Bank (2016).  
Table 3. Likely requirements for successful voluntary managed retreat after a disaster strikes 
Likely requirements Present on Staten 
Island? 
Comment 
1. A history of flooding Yes Necessary but almost certainly 
not sufficient 
2. A belief that the flood situation will get no 
better, and might get worse in the foreseeable 
future (i.e. a forward look that is unattractive) 
Yes Essential 
3. A belief that alternatives are less attractive or 
not on offer in the foreseeable future  
Yes (i.e. the prospects 
for the sea wall) 
Essential 
4. Support from government/state/those who will 
pay (MR is usually very expensive) 
Generally, yes, with 
some significant 
dissent (NYC) 
Essential 
5. Trust in government and its agencies (to carry 
MR through over a period, not for just a single 
short period). 
Just about, thanks to 
much community 
action and leadership 
Likely to be essential 
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6. Community consent/acquiescence in some 
form or other (i.e. MR seen as (a) sensible and 
(b) not anti-social) 
Yes Perhaps not essential if 
householders are willing to 
“go it alone” 
7. Compensation is adequate: The value of 
houses plus a premium (say 10%) for removal 
costs, etc 
Yes, for the most part Probably essential 
8. There is somewhere reasonably close to move 
to (i.e. not 100s miles away) where house 
prices are similar and is (equally) attractive 
Not known; not part of 
the offers 
Probably important but 
difficult to judge; this depends 
on the individual householder 
9. That, for the individual householder, being left 
as a “hold-out” is unattractive. 
Probably Perhaps not essential if 
householders are willing to 
“go it alone” 
10. That the area will not be cleared and then 
redeveloped (for developer profit). 
Yes Probably important but this 
depends on the individual 
householder 
11. The arrangements are transparent and 
unambiguous for all to see and understand. 
Mostly, thanks to 
community action and 
leadership  
Probably essential to avoid a 
suspicion of “private deals” 
12. A local champion or champions to promote 
community rather than individual MR. 
Yes Almost certainly essential if a 
major MR program is to 
happen 
Our findings suggest that the prospects for successful MR before a disaster strikes are likely 
to hinge on the same requirements, but for them to be even more demanding. The evidence 
we obtained suggests that implementation is then still very likely to be unsuccessful. The 
sparsity of relevant examples found by Hino et al (2017) show that such pre-disaster 
proposals for retreat, although apparently logical, are not acceptable to those at risk and that 
MR in these circumstances simply does not occur. 
Our findings therefore show that pre-disaster and long-term plans for vulnerable areas are not 
easy to implement (at least in areas with the same socio-political character as Staten Island). 
We appreciate that MR needs to be located alongside and in comparison with other risk 
reducing measures, a dimension that Hino et al. (2017) chose to ignore. Measures such as 
spatial planning and development control to prevent unwise decisions and potential damage 
buildup appear all but impossible to implement where knowledge of the adverse impacts of 
recent disaster events is missing, where a policy vacuum therefore exists, or where there is 
the type of “light touch” spatial planning regime as on Staten Island - which the communities 
there knowingly or unknowingly strongly still support.  
Even on Staten Island, in the shadow of Sandy, many communities have begun 
redevelopment, perpetuating vulnerability, not least because MR is too expensive in the short 
term to be universal, and - worryingly - maybe Sandy was not extreme enough or such 
damaging events not repeated often enough to create a sufficient “last straw” tipping point 
effect.  
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We acknowledge that we have only researched one case study, but we judge that the same 
patterns are likely elsewhere, even where anti-interventionism is not so common. 
Implementation of MR was not easily achieved in New York and is not likely to be 
straightforward wherever it is voluntarily undertaken: the consensus about what triggers 
action toward MR shows that the “prisoner of experience” (Kates, 1962) is alive and well. It 
took the 1953 storm in the Netherlands and the UK to trigger those countries‟ defence against 
the sea (e.g. Waverly,1954), and it has taken Sandy-severe type „superstorms‟ on many 
coastlines worldwide to lead to conclusions that such locations as Staten Island South Shore 
are too risky to develop and need to be abandoned (Hino et al,. 2017). But without first there 
being a disaster, MR will not happen, despite the risk probably being apparent and the 
relevant locations being relatively undefended. Communities at risk often have unrealistic 
ideas about climate change and the timescales at work, assuming damaging events, if 
experienced, will not recur (at least in their lifetimes). They opt to stay put.  
However, such disasters do change the available information (Johnson et al., 2005; 
Penning-Rowsell et al., 2006). As Kates (1962) showed and Parker (1995) confirmed, 
individuals pre-disaster often have little information or insights as to hurricanes and other 
disasters events and their flood hazard potential. They build or buy where they see multiple 
benefits and little or no risk or need for state intervention or insurance: only 20 percent of 
those suffering damage from Sandy had purchased flood insurance before the storm (Botzen 
et al, 2015). Post-disaster they appreciate the risks all too well, and the benefits of being 
bought out by state agencies at favourable prices if that process becomes a new social norm. 
The paradox is real, but in neither situation are individuals in any sense „irrational‟ as some 
might conclude; the information on which they act has fundamentally changed and the social 
contract they have with the state changes in step. 
In the broader picture, it is most unlikely that all vulnerable coastal communities worldwide 
can be defended against likely future sea level rise (Hauer, et al, 2016; Nicholls et al, 2011; 
IPCC, 2013). Managed retreat will need to be commonplace, probably within a portfolio of 
measures to reduce risk and save lives. We judge from our research that what should happen 
is a mediated program of community based enquiry to work with householders and planners 
to reduce vulnerability at a local collective level. If community created, supported and led it 
should circumvent the likely anti-government sentiment. This in turn could lead to planning 
procedures to remove and to relocate with consensus and to find funds from disaster 
emergency and insurance avoidance monies to help communities develop a long term phased 
adaptation strategy which is constantly updated.  
That is the optimistic scenario. However, based also on the research reported here, we must 
be realistic and assume that such pre-disaster planning and anticipatory MR for this risk 
reduction will rarely if ever happen. Funding for voluntary MR ahead of a disaster will often 
not be forthcoming; governments (as in the UK) may well refuse to resource plans to correct 
mistakes made in the past that were not their responsibility but resulted from local 
community-based decisions. Much can be done in terms of strategic planning for 
hazard-prone areas, but we need thereby also to plan for the worst. We may have to await the 
inevitable disasters, and then be ready to act: a worrying conclusion and a dismal prognosis.  
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